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Abstract
We interpret workers’ confidence in their own skills as their morale, and investigate the
implication of worker overconfidence on the firm’s optimal wage-setting policies. In our model,
wage contracts both provide incentives and affect worker morale, by revealing private information
of the firm about worker skills. We provide conditions for the non-differentiation wage policy
to be profit-maximizing. In numerical examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary condition
for the firm to prefer no wage differentiation, so as to preserve some workers’ morale; the non-
differentiation wage policy itself breeds more worker overconfidence; finally, wage compression
is more likely when aggregate productivity is low.
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1 Introduction
Most of corporate America abstain from wage differentiation among workers assigned to similar
tasks. At the individual firm level, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) studied the wage policy of
a large firm and found that individual workers’ wages are largely determined by their cohorts (the
year of entry into the firm) and their job levels. At the aggregate level, there is substantial evidence
of wage compression in the sense that the wage distribution is less dispersed than the underlying
distribution of productivity.1
In a pioneering survey of wage-setting practices of over three hundred business executives and
personnel managers, Bewley (1999) found that wage differentiation among workers assigned to sim-
ilar tasks are especially avoided when selective wage cuts are involved. Moreover, an overwhelming
number of firms believed that selective wage cuts would hurt worker morale, so they would lay
workers off rather than offer them a lower wage.2 Since wage differentiation is likely to boost the
morale of some workers while hurting the morale of others, these executives must mean that the
benefit from morale boost to some workers is outweighed by the cost from morale loss to others.
Worker morale is a buzz word in the business world.3 But what exactly is worker morale? How is
morale affected by wage-setting practices, and vice versa? Can firms’ concern for worker morale help
explain wage compression? How does morale affect incentives? What determines whether a firm
should adopt a differentiation or a non-differentiation wage policy? How do aggregate productivity
fluctuations affect the benefits and costs of wage differentiation? These are the questions that we
address in this paper.
In Bewley’s (1999) survey, respondents have many different views of morale. Some emphasize
its collective nature. For example, the owner of a small manufacturing company responded that
“Morale is having employees feel good about working for the company and respecting it. The
employee with good morale likes his work ...”. Others have a more individualistic orientation. For
example, a general manager of a large company said that “Morale equals motivation.” Bewley
(1999) summarizes that morale meant “emotional attitudes toward work, co-workers, and the or-
ganization. Good morale meant a sense of common purpose consistent with company goals and
meant cooperativeness, happiness or tolerance of unpleasantness, and zest for the job.” In this
paper, we adopt an individualistic approach and interpret a worker’s morale as her confidence in
1It is well documented that the rate of unemployment is lower among older, more experienced, more educated,
and in general, more productive workers. This means that more productive workers are more employable from the
firms’ viewpoint. As argued in Moscarini (1996), a natural implication of this fact is wage compression, defined as a
lower inequality in wages than in individual skills.
2Not all firms oppose wage differentiation in the workplace. Former GE Chairman and CEO Jack Welch (2001),
for example, believed that strong workforces are built by treating individuals differently: “Some contend that differ-
entiation is nuts — bad for morale. ... Not in my world.” (See, however, our footnotes 11 and 15.)
3A search using keyword “morale” in Lexis-Nexis Academic Business News Database retrieves more than 1000
documents in the previous six months.
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her own ability. This is consistent with some of the above responses but a little narrower, and we
believe that it is a relevant view: in our model, a worker with high confidence of her own ability
believes that she can “make a difference” (in increasing output and obtaining a high bonus) by
exerting effort; thus, in our model, a worker’s morale is an intrinsic motivation. A worker has “high
morale” when she thinks that her effort has a large impact on output; and conversely, a worker is
demoralized when she believes that her costly effort is basically useless.
In our model, a principal (i.e. the firm) hires many agents (i.e. the workers) to produce output.
Each worker’s output depends on her own effort and ability but not on those of other workers.
As is standard, effort is not contractible. The ability of each worker is uncertain. The principal
privately observes a performance evaluation of each worker, which is informative about her ability;
and workers observe each other’s received contract offers. Our first innovation is to consider the
effects of relative wage comparisons by workers on the perception that they have about their own
skills. Incentive contracts play a signaling besides their traditional allocative role, and affect worker
incentives through both channels. The firm can either condition its wage offers on performance
evaluations (differentiation policy), or conceal its opinion about workers’ abilities by offering the
same contract to all employees (non-differentiation policy).
Any wage differentiation will have two effects. The first is a sorting effect, which is beneficial
to the firm by allowing it to tailor incentive contracts to each worker’s ability. The second is a
morale effect, which is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, wage differentiation breaks bad
news to some workers and depresses their morale; on the other hand, it also breaks good news to
other workers and boosts their morale. If effort and ability are complements in production, then
workers who suffer a loss in morale are discouraged from exerting effort and hurt the firm’s profits;
we call this the negative morale effect. The other workers are further encouraged and work harder,
producing a positive morale effect on firm profits. If instead effort and ability are substitutes,
negative and positive morale effects switch places: a loss in morale induces the affected workers
to try even harder, to compensate the lack of ability; while those who gain morale now believe
their natural talent to be sufficient for a good performance at lower effort, and hurt the firm’s
profits. Either way, one of the two groups of workers optimally reduce effort simply because of the
information they acquire. This negative morale effect of wage differentiation is what we term the
Morale Hazard. The wage-setting policy in our model essentially is an instrument of the firm to
manipulate the workers’ self-confidence. The difference between wage and cheap-talk methods as
means of confidence management is that the former is the only credible instrument since it is costly
for the firm to break good news by raising compensations.
Our second innovation is to allow firm and workers to hold different prior beliefs regarding the
workers’ ability, and this initial disagreement is common knowledge. This assumption is motivated
by the findings in psychological research (reviewed in the next section) that people tend to be over-
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confident about their own possession of any desirable traits, in particular, one’s own ability. When
workers are initially sufficiently more confident about their ability than the firm, the average morale
of the workforce falls when information is revealed by differentiated wage contracts because, in such
circumstances, “on average the truth is bad news”. While the firm faces a trade-off irrespective of
complementarity or substitutability between effort and ability, the case of complementarity inter-
acts interestingly with overconfidence: a loss in morale is followed by an average decline in effort
and profits, which may more than compensate the positive morale effect and the sorting effect, thus
making wage differentiation undesirable. In numerical examples assuming complementarity, wage
differentiation dominates no differentiation when the firm and workers share identical initial beliefs;
but as the workers become more overconfident, the non-differentiation policy eventually dominates.
We also find a sense in which “overconfidence begets overconfidence”. The more overconfident the
workforce, and the lower its true average ability, the more likely the firm to offer a pooling contract
and to conceal its private information; a majority of workers are spared the bad news and become
even more overconfident. Finally, we find that wage compression is more likely when aggregate
productivity is low (relative to workers’ outside options.)
In our model, wage differentiation among retained employees hurts the morale of some workers,
thus a firm may find it too costly to keep such demoralized workers and would rather lay them off
altogether. This provides an alternative explanation to the puzzle of “involuntary layoffs”: laid-off
workers in many cases believe that their relationship with the firm could still generate positive
joint surplus (relative to the sum of their outside options) and question why the firm would choose
not to keep them at a reduced wage. The standard answer rests on some form of non-transferable
utility. Our answer is different: the workers simply over-estimate the surplus from the relationship
because of their overconfidence.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the
related economic literature on wage compression, and of the large psychological literature underlying
our behavioral assumption that workers are overconfident of their own ability or skills; Section 3
presents the model; Section 4 characterizes the optimal wage contract for any belief pair of the
worker and the firm, and the profit-maximizing set of contracts offered to the workforce; Section
5 provides examples to illustrate when the non-differentiation wage-setting policy is optimal for
the firm; Section 6 presents some discussion of the model and results, as well as some testable




The economics literature has proposed several explanations for wage compression, ranging from
incentives not to sabotage colleagues competing in a tournament (Lazear 1989) to differences in
labor supply elasticities as reflected in wages by bargaining in a frictional labor market (Moscarini
1996). In our model, the effect of wage differentiation on worker morale arises because of relative
wage comparisons. Thus the non-differentiation wage policy is related to the concept of “fairness.”
Indeed, unfairness by the employer is likely to impact on production through, if any, the resulting
loss in worker morale. These ideas are appealing and intuitive from simple introspection, and they
form the basis of the prominent efficiency wage theory. Solow (1979), and Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
have pioneered the theoretical work on the effects of fairness considerations in wage-setting. Inspired
by equity theory in social psychology and social exchange theory in sociology, and supported by
ample field evidence, they postulated that worker effort depends not on the offered wage per se, but
on its divergence from a “fair” reference wage, which depends on what other comparable workers
earn. “[..] when people do not get what they deserve, they try to get even.” (Akerlof and Yellen
1990)
Instead of assuming it, our model rationalizes the “fair-wage/effort” behavioral hypothesis by
showing that, when workers suffer from the often observed human judgement bias, namely self
overconfidence, firms may in fact find it optimal to treat workers equally despite different perfor-
mance measurements. Related to our paper, Rotemberg (2002) studies a model in which employers
possess some signals about the workers’ productivity, and investigates the effect of the employee’s
perception of the employer’s precision in evaluating individual abilities on income distributions. In
his model, “fair” evaluation is akin to “accurate” evaluation. In contrast, in our model, it is the
outcome, rather than the precision, of the firm’s performance evaluation that is unknown to the
worker. Wage compression relative to productivities arises in our model because the wage-setting
employer finds it optimal to strategically hide its information about the employees’ abilities in order
to preserve morale.
Our paper is also related to an emerging economics literature that explores the connection
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.4 Benabou and Tirole (2002, Section 2) analyze a
mechanism design problem of a principal who is privately informed about the cost of a task that an
agent is to perform. They show that, when both base wage and bonus are feasible, the only perfect
Bayesian equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) is separating, hence
the firm’s incentive scheme always reveals its private information to the worker. In our model,
the firm simultaneously employs many, in fact, a continuum of, workers. The common candidate
4See Kreps (1997) for a review of the related social and industrial psychology and economics literature.
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deviation to break a pooling equilibrium is not valid in our context, since any such proposed
deviation contract will create an informational externality by affecting the morale of other workers
who are not offered the same contract.
Prendergast (1991) also examines strategic information revelation by an informed principal to
its workers in the context of a training-promotion problem similar to our model, but with common
prior beliefs. He did not show whether and under which conditions the firm prefers a pooling
contract.
Bewley (1999, Chapter 21) presents a model in which a worker’s realized pace of work is directly
affected by her mood (his conceptualization of morale) possibly through some unmodelled physio-
logical process. In contrast, morale in our model is not a direct input of either the production or
the utility function of the workers. Instead, a worker’s morale affects her incentives by affecting
her perception of the effects of her effort.
A similar dilemma of information revelation by a principal is analyzed by Feess, Schieble and
Walzl (2001). In their model, an agent spends effort to forecast the quality of a project; and the
principal can privately observe an additional informative signal about the project and decides, ex
ante, whether to disclose his signal to the agent before she exerts effort. In our model, the principal
can condition its disclosure decision on the private information realization. Our paper differs from
both Benabou and Tirole (2002) and Feess et al. (2001) in that we consider a firm with many
workers who observe each other’s received offers. Lizzeri, Meyer and Persico (2002) analyze a two-
period principal agent or tournament model, where each agent can observe neither her first-period
output nor her own ability. They focus on the desirability of performing interim performance
evaluation and revealing it to the agents. In their setting, worker ability is only a parameter in
the principal’s objective function, which affects neither the agent’s marginal productivity of effort
nor its cost. Therefore, revelation of information on ability does not have the direct impact on the
incentive of the agents that we call the “morale effect.”
2.2 Psychological Evidence of Overconfidence
Psychological evidence of overconfidence is first and foremost reflected in the “above median”
effect, whereby well over half of survey respondents typically judge themselves in possession of more
desirable attributes than fifty percent of other individuals. In Svenson (1981), 81 American and 80
Swedish students were asked to judge their skill in driving and how safe they were as drivers. It
was found that 92.8% of American and 68.7% of Swedish subjects rated themselves as safer than
50% of other drivers. In Larwood and Whittaker (1977), 72 undergraduate management students
and 48 presidents of New York state manufacturing firms are asked to rate themselves relative to
their classmates or fellow presidents in IQ, likelihood of success, predicted growth in a hypothetical
marketing problem, etc. The results indicate an astonishing level of overconfidence: of the 72
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students, only 10 felt that they were merely of average intelligence relative to their own classmates
and only 2 thought themselves below average; and only 18 of the 72 subjects predicted that their
hypothetical firm’s sales would be below the industry average. The executive sample also predicted
inordinate success, even though more moderate than the students. In Meyer (1975), less than 5%
of employees rated themselves below the median.
Psychological evidence of overconfidence is also reflected in the “fundamental attribution error”
(Aronson 1994), that is, people tend to attribute their successes to ability and skill, but their
failure to bad luck or to factors out of their control. Such self-serving biases are bound to lead
to overconfidence. Psychologists have gathered a great deal of evidence for the observation that
we take credit for the good and deny the bad. For example, students who do well on an exam
attribute their performance to ability and effort, whereas those who do poorly attribute it to a
poor exam or bad luck (Arkin and Maruyama 1979); gamblers perceive their success as based on
skill and their failure as a fluke (Gilovich 1983); when married couples estimate how much of the
housework each routinely did, their combined total of housework performed amounts to more than
100 percent - in other words, each person thinks he or she did more work than their partner think
he or she did (Ross and Sicoly 1979); two-person teams performing a skilled task accept credit for
the good scores but assign most of the blame for the poor scores to their partner (Johnston 1967);
when asked to explain why someone else dislikes them, college students take little responsibility
for themselves (i.e., there must be something wrong with this other person), but when told that
someone else likes them, the students attributed it to their own personality (Cunningham, Starr
and Kanouse 1979).5
3 The Model
Initial Beliefs. Consider a firm who employs for one period a continuum of workers with unit
measure. Workers differ in their ability (or interchangeably, productivity or talent) denoted by a.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that a worker’s ability a ∈ {al, ah} , where ah > al > 0.We refer
to al and ah respectively as low and high ability. For each worker, neither she nor the firm knows
the true value of her ability. The firm has an objective prior belief q0 that each worker has high
ability. We assume that the workers’ ability types are independent, hence by Large Numbers q0 is
also the proportion of high ability workers in the firm. In contrast, each worker has a prior belief
p0 that she has high ability. Importantly, we allow the worker and the firm to have heterogeneous
beliefs about a, that is, p0 and q0 do not have to be equal.
6 In particular, as motivated by the
5See Aronson (1994, Chapter 4) for more evidence of self-serving bias. Other authors have also provided similar
reviews. See Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Malmendier and Tate (2001), Compte
and Postlewaite (2001), among others.
6We are aware that heterogenous priors violate Harsanyi’s doctrine. See Morris (1995) for a persuasive argument
that neither Bayesian decision theory nor standard theories of rationality requires agents to have the same priors.
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psychological evidence reviewed in Section 2, we will be interested in the case when the workers are
overconfident about their ability relative to the firm’s objective assessment, that is, when p0 ≥ q0.
The initial beliefs p0 and q0 are common knowledge, and when they are not equal, we assume that
each party believes the other to be wrong in its assessment of ability.
Production Technology. For simplicity, we assume that each employed worker can produce
two levels of output, which are, without loss of generality, normalized to 0 (low output) or y (high
output) where y > 0. The production technology is stochastic as follows: if a worker with ability
aj , j ∈ {h, l} exerts effort n ≥ 0, then the probability of high output is
Pr (Y = y|aj, n) = πj (n) , j ∈ {h, l}
where π0j > 0,π
00
j < 0 and satisfy πj (0) = 0, limn→∞ πj (n) = π̄j ≤ 1, and πh (n) > πl (n) for all
n > 0. In words, we assume that a worker produces low output unless she exerts positive effort.
We assume that output realizations conditional on individual values of a and n are independent
across workers.
The cost of effort is independent of the worker’s ability and is given by C (n) with C (0) =
0, C0 > 0 and C 00 ≥ 0. Following the standard assumptions in principal-agent models, we assume
that a worker’s effort is not observable to the firm, while her output is observable and verifiable by
all parties (including possibly the court).
Performance Evaluation. The firm, before beginning (or continuing) the relationship, receives
a signal θ ∈ {l, h} of each individual’s ability.7 The signals are independently and identically drawn
as follows:
Pr {θ = l|a = al} = Pr {θ = h|a = ah} = α,
where α > 1/2 measures the signal’s informativeness of a worker’s ability. Importantly, it is assumed
that the realization of each worker’s signal θ is privately observed by the firm. A worker does not
directly observe her performance evaluation θ, but she may possibly infer θ from the wage contract
offered by the firm.
Belief Updating and Morale. The firm uses each worker’s signal θ to update its belief about
her ability. We write qθ as the firm’s posterior belief from Bayes’ rule that a worker with signal θ
has high ability, that is,
qh =
q0α
q0α+ (1− q0) (1− α) , ql =
q0 (1− α)
q0 (1− α) + (1− q0)α .
A worker does not directly observe her performance evaluation θ, but if she ever infers θ from
contract offers (that is, when the firm offers different wage contracts to workers with different
See Morris (1994) and Allen and Gale (1999) for models in which agents have heterogenous prior beliefs.
7There are a couple of possible interpretations of the signal θ: it could be the test results of a training period if
the relationship is new; or it could be non-output performance evaluation of the worker’s ability from the previous
periods if the relationship is continuing.
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performance evaluations), she will form a posterior belief pθ regarding her ability by Bayes’ rule:
ph =
p0α
p0α+ (1− p0) (1− α) , pl =
p0 (1− α)
p0 (1− α) + (1− p0)α .
Note that we allow the firm and the workers to agree to disagree on their priors and their subsequent
interpretations of the performance evaluations. A worker’s confidence about her ability is what we
mean by worker morale in this paper: p0 is the worker’s initial morale; and pθ is her morale if she
learns her performance evaluation from the wage offers. A worker’s morale is hurt after knowing
that she receives a low evaluation, and is boosted after knowing of a high evaluation because
pl < p0 < ph.
Since the firm employs a continuum of workers, it knows beforehand, by Large Numbers, that a
measure q0 of workers has ability ah, a measure αq0+ (1− α) (1− q0) of workers will obtain signal
realizations θ = h, and so on. In other words, the firm does not encounter any aggregate surprises.
The role of the performance evaluations for the firm is to probabilistically identify and sort workers
of ability ah. After observing the signals, the firm knows again by Large Numbers that a fraction
qh of those workers with high evaluations is indeed of ability ah; while for the remaining 1 − qh
fraction of the high evaluations was inaccurate. The firm reasons similarly for workers for whom it
has given a poor performance evaluation θ = l.
Preferences. The firm and the workers are risk-neutral. To make the problem interesting,
we assume that the workers have limited liability, i.e., a worker’s total compensation cannot be
negative. The outside option of the firm, namely the value of a vacancy, is V0 ≥ 0; and the
outside option of a worker, namely the value of unemployment, is U0 ≥ 0 at the beginning of this
relationship. We assume that both U0 and V0 are constant. In particular, the worker’s outside
option U0 is independent of her morale, which is reasonable only when ability is firm-specific.
Wage Contract. Because the output level is assumed to be either high or low, a contingent wage
contract is simply a two-tier contract {w,∆} , where w is the base wage to be received regardless
of the level of output, and ∆ is the bonus to be paid only when output is high.8 The firm decides,
for each worker, whether to offer her a contract, and if so, the terms of contract. We assume that
the firm can credibly commit to any contract, and that each worker can observe all wage contracts,
or lack thereof, offered by the firm to her colleagues.9 A worker compares her wage contract with
others’, makes inference about her performance evaluation privately observed by the firm, and
adjust her morale accordingly.
8In principle, the firm could condition payments to a worker on the entire distribution of outputs, as in a tour-
nament. However, by Large Numbers, for any set of contract offers the resulting distribution of outputs is known
beforehand by each worker, and does not affect her incentives. Hence, our two-tier contract covers this case too.
9This assumption might appear unrealistic in many contexts, as it is well-known that many employers consider
wage information disclosure taboo, occasionally prohibiting it formally in their labor contracts. However, this kind
of secrecy policy is hard to implement in practice. In addition, for those cases where information-sharing is effec-
tively prevented, our analysis maybe useful as a counterfactual, to understand why firms have an interest in such
confidentiality rules, and workers in breaking them.
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The firm can adopt two possible wage-setting policies. The first is a non-differentiation policy
(or interchangeably, pooling contract policy) under which the firm offers the same wage contract
to all workers irrespective of their individual performance evaluations. A worker does not induce
any inference on her own ability, thus her morale is maintained at the initial level p0. The second
is a differentiation policy (or interchangeably, separating contracts policy) under which different
wage contracts are offered according to the individual performance evaluations. A worker infers in
equilibrium her individual performance evaluation and updates her morale to ph or pl accordingly.
We are interested in when the firm will find differentiation or non-differentiation wage-setting
policies optimal.
4 Analyzing the Model
In this section, we first characterize the firm’s optimal wage contract for a generic belief pair
{p, q} regarding the worker’s ability. The relevant values of p and q may depend on whether
differentiation or non-differentiation wage-setting policies are in consideration. Then, we analyze
the profit-maximizing set of contracts offered to the workforce.
4.1 Worker’s Problem
Suppose that a worker with morale p is offered a wage contract {w,∆}. Then, she chooses





{w +∆ [pπh (n) + (1− p)πl (n)]−C (n)} ; U0
¾
,
where the inner maximization yields the expected utility from accepting the offer and optimally
choosing effort. If we temporarily ignore the non-negativity constraint on n, the inner maximization
problem is concave with the necessary and sufficient first order condition:
∆
£
pπ0h (n) + (1− p)π0l (n)
¤
= C0 (n) , (1)
which yields a unique optimal level of effort n∗(∆, p).
For n∗(∆, p) to be positive, the bonus must be large enough. Simple algebra shows that
n∗(∆, p) ≥ 0 if and only if
∆ ≥ C
0 (0)
pπ0h (0) + (1− p)π0l (0)
≡ ∆
If a firm does not find it optimal to provide a bonus at least as high as ∆, then such workers with
morale p will be laid off. A firm is willing to offer a bonus at least ∆ only if y > ∆; otherwise, due
to our limited liability assumption on the worker, the firm will for sure lose money. To make things
interesting, we take this as an assumption:
Assumption. y > ∆.
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Not surprisingly, the worker’s effort level does not depend on the base wage w and is increasing
in the level of bonus ∆. The following lemma provides sufficient conditions under which the optimal
effort n∗ is concave in ∆, a property that will be used later.10
Lemma 1 Sufficient conditions for n∗ (·, p) to be concave in ∆ are: (i) C000 ≥ 0, and (ii) pπ0h +
(1− p)π0l is log-concave.
4.2 Firm’s Problem
We now analyze the firm’s choice of the optimal contract to offer to a single worker, given poste-
rior beliefs q and p on her ability. The posteriors are generated by prior beliefs q0, p0, performance
evaluation outcome θ, and information on θ revealed to the worker by the contract itself (if any).
Given a contract {w,∆} and the worker’s optimal effort choice n∗(∆, p), the perceived expected
utility of a worker with morale p from accepting the wage contract {w,∆}, is
U (w,∆; p) = w+ [pπh(n
∗(∆, p)) + (1− p)πl(n∗(∆, p))]∆−C(n∗(∆, p));
which must exceed the outside option for the contract to be acceptable:
U (w,∆; p) ≥ U0. (2)
The perceived expected profit to the firm with belief q from offering a contract {w,∆} to a worker
with morale p is
V (w,∆; p, q) = [qπh(n
∗(∆, p)) + (1− q)πl(n∗(∆, p))] (y −∆)−w (3)
which must exceed the outside option for the contract to be offered:
V (w,∆; p, q) ≥ V0. (4)
A contract {w,∆} is (p, q)-feasible if it satisfies (2) and (4). The firm’s problem is:
max
{w≥0,∆≥∆}
V (w,∆; p, q)
s.t. (2), (4). (5)
The following two lemmas follow from standard arguments:
Lemma 2 The solution to the firm’s problem (5) exists.
Lemma 3 In any optimal contract {w,∆}, the worker’s participation constraint (2) must bind if
w > 0, namely if the base wage exceeds the limited-liability floor.
10The proofs of Lemmas 1-3 and 5 are omitted. They are contained in the working paper version of this study and
available from the authors upon request.
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Note that the worker’s participation constraint in general will be slack because of the limited
liability assumption. We now establish that when the worker is at least as confident as the firm, a
case we focus on, then the firm can without loss of generality only choose a level of bonus and set
the base wage to zero:
Proposition 1 If p ≥ q, then any optimal contract has a zero base wage: w = 0.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. If there exists an optimal contract with w > 0, then by
Lemma 3 the worker’s participation constraint (2) must bind. Hence we can solve for w from (2)
holding as an equality to obtain
w = U0 − [pπh(n∗(∆, p)) + (1− p)πl(n∗(∆, p))]∆+C(n∗(∆, p)).
Replacing it into the objective function of the firm in the inner maximization problem of (5), we




∆ (p− q) [πh(n∗(∆, p))− πl(n∗(∆, p))]
+ [qπh(n
∗(∆, p)) + (1− q)πl(n∗(∆, p))] y −C(n∗(∆, p))− U0
¾
.
The first order derivative with respect to ∆ is
(p− q) [πh(n∗(∆, p))− πl(n∗(∆, p))] +
£
qπ0h(n





which is strictly positive whenever ∆ < y and p ≥ q. Hence the firm maximizes profits by loading
maximum incentives and offering ∆ = y. But then the firm never obtains any output and pays a
positive base wage w > 0. Thus the firm’s expected profit is negative by offering the optimal wage
contract with w > 0, violating the firm’s participation constraint, that is the firm can do better by
offering no contract. A contradiction.
Note, by continuity, Proposition 1 should also hold for any p < q as long as it is sufficiently
close to q; but, when the worker is sufficiently under-confident, the optimal base wage w may be
strictly positive. The reason is as follows: when q is sufficiently larger than p, the firm does not
want to offer too high a bonus because it expects the worker to receive it very often. However,
the worker disagrees and a low bonus alone may not satisfy her participation constraint. Thus, the
firm has to make it up with a strictly positive base wage.
When p ≥ q, Proposition 1 tells us that the optimal contract will have a zero base wage. Thus




∗(∆, p)) + (1− q)πl(n∗(∆, p))] (y −∆);
s.t. (2), (4). (6)
To characterize the solution to problem (6), we first ignore the participation constraints (2), (4)
and check them ex post.
11
Lemma 4 If the worker’s optimal effort n∗(·, p) is concave in the bonus ∆, then the inner maxi-
mization problem in (6) has a unique solution ∆∗(p, q) ∈ (∆, y) which implicitly solves the first-order
condition:
0 =
∂V (0,∆; p, q)
∂∆
= (y −∆) £qπ0h(n∗(∆, p)) + (1− q)π0l(n∗(∆, p))¤ ∂n∗(∆, p)∂∆
− [qπh(n∗(∆, p)) + (1− q)πl(n∗(∆, p))] ; (7)
Proof. Eq. (7) provides the first order condition for the inner problem in (6). Clearly, the second
derivative of the value is negative if n∗(·, p) is concave in ∆. Evaluated at ∆, the second term of
Eq. (7) is zero and thus smaller than the first term; and evaluated at y, the first term is zero and
thus larger than the second term. Therefore, there is a unique solution ∆∗(p, q) ∈ (∆, y) to Eq.
(7).
It follows from the Implicit Function Theorem applied to Eq. (7) that the candidate optimal
bonus ∆∗(p, q) is increasing in y, the output level in case of success.
So far, we have neglected firm’s and worker’s participation constraint in problem (6). The so-
lution ∆∗(p, q) characterized in Lemma 4 will be the actual solution to problem (5) if {0,∆∗(p, q)}
is (p, q)-feasible. Otherwise, we consider two cases: (i) If {0,∆∗(p, q)} violates the firm’s participa-
tion constraint (4), then the firm will offer no contract to a worker with morale p, and will lay her
off. The reason is simple: by definition, V (0,∆∗(p, q); p, q) is the maximum the firm can achieve
by choosing ∆ when w = 0 (recall that we established in Proposition 1 that no optimal contract
with w > 0 exists). (ii) If the firm’s participation constraint (4) holds but the worker’s (2) fails at
{0,∆∗(p, q)}, namely U (0,∆∗(p, q); p) < U0, then the firm will have to consider offering a higher










and U (0,∆; p) is




if and only if its expected surplus
from offering such a contract yields more than its outside option, i.e.
V
¡
0, ∆̄ (p) ; p, q
¢ ≥ V0. (9)
We summarize the above discussions in the following:
Proposition 2 Fix any generic belief pair by a worker and the firm (p, q), with p ≥ q. Consider
bonus levels ∆∗(p, q) and ∆̄ (p) respectively defined by (7) and (8).
1. If {0,∆∗(p, q)} is (p, q)-feasible, then it is the optimal contract;
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2. If {0,∆∗(p, q)} is not (p, q)-feasible, but ©0, ∆̄ (p)ª satisfies (9), then ©0, ∆̄ (p)ª is the optimal
contract;
3. In any other cases, the firm offers no contract to the worker.
We introduce the following notation to ease exposition below:
∆̃(p, q) =

∆∗(p, q) if {0,∆∗(p, q)} is (p, q)-feasible
∆̄ (p) if






where ∅ stands for “no contract.” Also define Ṽ (p, q) as the firm’s maximal profit from offering the
optimal contract (including the null contract), i.e.,
Ṽ (p, q) = V
³
0, ∆̃(p, q); p, q
´
where V (0, ∅; p, q) ≡ V0.
4.3 The Optimal Set of Contracts
Proposition 2 characterizes the firm’s optimal contract (or no contract) to a single worker for a
generic belief pair (p, q) with p ≥ q. We now characterize the optimal set of contracts offered to all
workers, taking into account the effect on the workers’ beliefs from observing the contract offers.
Non-Differentiation Wage Policy. If the firm offers the same contract {0,∆} to all workers,
they will all maintain their morale at the original level p0. However, the firm still possesses private
information regarding each individual worker. That is, the firm still knows precisely who obtains
good performance evaluation θ = h and who obtains bad performance evaluation θ = l. The firm’s






[αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0)]V (w,∆; p0, qh)






where the first term in the objective function of the inner maximization problem is the firm’s
expected profit from all the workers who have received θ = h; and the second term is the firm’s
expected profit from all the worker who have received θ = l. Recall that from the Law of Large
Numbers, a measure αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0) of workers receive a good performance evaluation, and
the remaining α(1− q0) + (1− α) q0 measure receive a bad evaluation.
Using the linearity of the function V (w,∆; p, q) in q [see Eq. (3)] and the martingale property
of the firm’s belief, we immediately have
[αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0)]V (w,∆; p0, qh) + [α(1− q0) + (1− α) q0]V (w,∆; p0, ql)
= [q0πh(n
∗(∆, p0)) + (1− q0)πl(n∗(∆, p0))] (y −∆)−w.
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Replacing this expression in (11), since p0 ≥ q0, Proposition 1 applies and w = 0. Thus, problem
(11) is identical to problem (6). This implies that under a non-differentiation policy the optimal
uniform base wage is zero and the optimal bonus is exactly given by ∆̃(p0, q0). We thus reach an
important conclusion: under a non-differentiation policy, the firm’s private performance evaluation
is irrelevant, both strategically (by the definition of pooling) and statistically because of the Law of
Large Numbers and expected utility. The firm will offer a contract ∆̃(p0, q0) as described by (10)
to all workers, and its expected profit under a non-differentiation policy is V P = Ṽ (p0, q0).
Differentiation Wage Policy. If the firm adopts a differentiation wage-setting policy, then the
contracts will reveal to each worker the performance evaluation privately observed by the firm.
Then p0 ≥ q0 implies pθ ≥ qθ, and our contract characterization applies to each worker type.
The firm then optimally offers to a worker with evaluation θ ∈ {l, h} the contract
n
0, ∆̃ (pθ, qθ)
o
characterized earlier. Overall, the firm’s expected profit under a differentiation policy is
V S = [αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0)] Ṽ (ph, qh) + [α(1− q0) + (1− α) q0] Ṽ (pl, ql).
Comparing Wage Policies. The difference between the firm’s expected profits from the differ-
entiation and non-differentiation policies, under our maintained assumption of weak worker over-
confidence p0 ≥ q0, can be usefully decomposed into three components as follows:
V S − V P =
sorting effectz }| { [αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0)] hṼ (p0, qh)− Ṽ (p0, q0)i
+[α (1− q0) + (1− α) q0]
h
Ṽ (p0, ql)− Ṽ (p0, q0)
i 
+
morale boost effectz }| {
[αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0)]
h
Ṽ (ph, qh)− Ṽ (p0, qh)
i
+
morale loss effectz }| {
[α(1− q0) + (1− α) q0]
h
Ṽ (pl, ql)− Ṽ (p0, ql)
i
. (12)
The first component is the sorting effect. It captures the gain under a differentiation policy if the
firm can tailor workers’ contracts according to their individual performance evaluations without,
hypothetically, altering the worker’s morale. Standard revealed-profit-maximization arguments
(see Lemma 5 below) show that the sorting effect is non-negative, thus in favor of differentiation
policy. The second component captures the change in profits due to higher morale from informing
workers with high performance evaluation of the good news. The last term captures the change
in profits due to lower morale from informing workers with low performance evaluation of the bad
news. As we will discuss shortly, the impact on firms’ profits of each morale effect depends on the
complementarity or substitutability of effort and ability in technology. But, one of the two morale
effects always reduces the profits of the firm from wage differentiation, thus a trade-off always exists.
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In Bayesian decision theory the value function is convex in beliefs by a simple revealed preference
argument and the martingale property of beliefs. Thus an informative signal is always beneficial
ex-ante. This force is at play here too, and is behind the sorting effect. The firm wants to allocate
efficiently workers that it perceives having different abilities to different carefully tailored incentive
contracts. As indicated above, this effect emerges formally if we fix worker’s beliefs and shut down
the signaling role of wage offers, thus preserving only the decision-theoretic part of the mechanism
design problem.
Lemma 5 If the worker’s participation constraint is slack at the optimal contract, that is if ∆̃(p0, qj) =
∆∗(p0, qj), j ∈ {0, h, l} , then the sorting effect is strictly positive for almost all q0 ∈ (0, 1) , and
p0 ≥ q0.
The only instances in which the sorting effect is zero are either: (1) the firm has extreme prior
beliefs q0 ∈ {0, 1} ; or (2) the worker’s participation constraint binds and the optimal contracts
under all belief pairs {p0, qj} , j ∈ {0, h, l} are ∆̄ (p0) ; or (3) no contracts are offered under all belief
pairs {p0, qj} , j ∈ {0, h, l}.
However, here contract offers have also a signaling role, and exert a morale effect by altering
the worker’s beliefs. In general, it is difficult to determine the net trade-offs of differentiation
and non-differentiation policies for any initial pair of beliefs (p0, q0). Indeed, we rely on numerical
examples in Section 5 to illustrate these trade-offs. However, we have the following two general
characterizations for some special cases of initial belief pairs:11
Proposition 3 For any q0 ∈ (0, 1), the firm’s expected profit under a differentiation policy is higher
than that under a non-differentiation policy:
1. as p0 → 1; or
2. when p0 = q0, if and only if Ṽ (p, p) is convex in p.
Proof. To prove the first statement, note that from Lemma 5, we know that the sorting effect is
strictly positive for any q0 ∈ (0, 1) , but the morale effects are equal to zero when p0 is equal to 1.
The conclusion then follows from continuity.
To prove the “if” part of the second statement, note that if p0 = q0, we have ph = qh, pl = ql;
moreover, p0 and q0 are convex combinations of ph and pl with weights exactly given by αq0 +
(1− α) (1− q0) and α(1− q0) + (1− α) q0 respectively. The “only if” part obviously follows from
the definition of convexity.
11The first claim of Proposition 3 provides a rationale for Jack Welch’s management philosophy mentioned in
footnote 2.
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Due to the strategic interaction, in general one is unable to establish the convexity of Ṽ (p, p), and
Proposition 3 is not generally applicable. What Proposition 3 provides is a simple characterization
of the superiority of the differentiation policy in terms of convexity of Ṽ (p, p) when the firm and
workers share identical initial beliefs p0 = q0. If instead, the workers are overconfident, i.e. p0 > q0,
then convexity no longer suffices. In either case, we show below by parametric examples that a
non-differentiation wage-setting policy may indeed dominate a differentiation policy.
A key insight of this paper is that the initial divergence of the levels of confidence between the
firm and workers will naturally lead to the changes in magnitudes of the sorting and morale effects.
In particular, a moderate level of worker overconfidence is likely to enlarge the morale loss relative
to the morale gain and to swamp the sorting effect; when effort and ability are complements,
this implies that the non-differentiation policy comes to dominate, as demonstrated in numerical
examples in Section 5.
4.4 Complementarity and Substitutability of Ability and Effort
The results that we have obtained so far hold independently of the complementarity or substi-
tutability of effort and ability in production, defined locally by the sign of π0h(n)−π0l(n). Imposing
one or the other assumption only changes the interpretation of the results.
We first discuss how complementarity and substitutability of ability and effort fit into our model.




l (n) dn and π̄h = limn→∞ πh (n) =R∞
0 π
0
h (n) dn. Therefore, if π̄l is sufficiently smaller than π̄h, then it is possible that ability and effort
are global complements, i.e. π0h(n) > π
0
l(n) for all n. Of course, given π̄l ≤ π̄h, it is impossible for
ability and effort to be global substitutes. On the other hand, if π̄l = π̄h, then evidently ability and
effort can not be global complements: if ability and effort are complements in some regions, they
must be local substitutes in some other regions. Moreover, if we further assume that π00h < π
00
l < 0,
then it can be shown that there exists an effort level n̂ such that π0h (·) crosses π0l (·) from above at
n̂. In other words, π0h (n) > π
0
l (n) if and only if n < n̂, where n̂ uniquely solves π
0
h (n̂) = π
0
l (n̂) .
To induce an effort level n̂ from the worker with morale p, the corresponding bonus level ∆̂ must
satisfy the firm’s first order condition evaluated at n = n̂, i.e.,
∆̂
£
pπ0h (n̂) + (1− p)π0l (n̂)
¤
= C0 (n̂) .
By the definition of n̂, we have π0h (n̂) = π
0
l (n̂) . Thus, ∆̂ = C
0 (n̂) /π0h (n̂) . If ∆̂ ≥ y, then the firm
will never optimally choose to offer a bonus as high as ∆̂; which in turn guarantees that the effort
level induced by the firm under the optimal contract will always be less than n̂. Hence the local
complements condition will be satisfied in equilibrium.
In our model, when the local complements condition is satisfied at n∗, morale serves an intrinsic
motivation; and the strength of the intrinsic motivation is affected by the extrinsic motivation,
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namely the firm’s wage policy. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to Eq. (1), we obtain
that n∗(∆, ·) increase in p if and only if ability and effort are local complements at n∗(∆, p). Also,
applying the Implicit Function Theorem to Eq. (7), we obtain that the candidate optimal bonus
∆∗(p, q) is strictly decreasing in p if ∂2n∗(∆, p)/∂∆∂p ≤ 0, which is not a general property of the
optimal effort function n∗(∆, p).12 But on net we have an unambiguous prediction for firm profits,
which determine the likelihood of wage compression. Applying the Envelope Theorem to Problem
(6), we immediately have:
Proposition 4 Fix the firm’s belief q and assume p ≥ q. Then the firm’s maximum expected profit
from hiring a worker with morale p, V (0,∆∗(p, q); p, q), is strictly increasing in p if and only if
ability and effort are local complements at n∗(∆∗(p, q), p).
Thus, when ability and effort are local complements, it is desirable for the firm to hire overcon-
fident workers because worker overconfidence serves as the intrinsic motivation for higher effort,
offsetting the moral hazard inefficiency. In this case, the morale boost effect in Eq. (12) amounts
for the firm to a positive morale effect on its profits, and the morale loss effect to a negative morale
effect. The more overconfident workers are to begin with, the more the morale loss dominates the
morale gain in the workforce, and the stronger the incentives for the firm not to differentiate wages.
The next section shows that this is indeed the case. When ability and effort are local substitutes,
all the conclusions are reversed; the negative morale effect is produced by the shirking workers who
receive good news and think no longer necessary to work hard to obtain the bonus.
4.5 Involuntary Layoffs
The firm may find it optimal to offer no contract to a particular type of worker, in which case
we may say that the worker is fired: ∆̃(p, q) = ∅ and V (0, ∅; p, q) ≡ V0. There exist parameter
values such the fired worker disagrees with the firm’s decision. The disagreement can arise for two
reasons. First, the worker may be able to support the relationship and produce profits for the firm
in excess of V0 if she could commit to the first-best effort. This would represent a strict Pareto
improvement over the termination of the relationship between the worker and the firm. However,
the firm knows that the worker cannot be trusted due to the standard moral hazard problem.
Our model also uncovers a new motive for disagreement. Given the worker’s optimistic belief, the
worker’s expectation of the firm’s expected profits from offering ∆̄ (p) , say, may be larger than V0
even when taking moral hazard into account; yet the firm’s perceived expected profit under its own
12It is interesting to contrast with Benabou and Tirole (2002), which make a stark prediction that, in equilibrium,
a higher bonus is necessarily associated with bad news in the sense that a principle will offer a higher bonus only
when she knows the task to be more difficult. The main reason is that in Benabou and Tirole’s model, the agent
makes a discrete choice of whether or not to exert effort, which is affected in an additively separable fashion by the
principal’s private information (if revealed) and the bonus.
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belief is smaller than V0:£
pπh(n
∗(∆̄(p), p)) + (1− p)πl(n∗(∆̄(p), p))
¤
(y − ∆̄(p)) > V0,£
qπh(n
∗(∆̄(p), p)) + (1− q)πl(n∗(∆̄(p), p))
¤
(y − ∆̄(p)) ≤ V0.
In this case the worker suffers a dismissal that from her viewpoint is Pareto dominated and thus
unjustified.
Finally, we can reinterpret Bewley (1999)’s finding that a layoff is typically preferred to a
selective wage cut because of the negative implications on worker morale. In the perspective of our
model, this fact implies that personnel managers consider effort and ability to be complements in
production, because they are worried about the effects of morale loss, not of morale gains. This
provides a further reason to focus on the complementarity case.
5 Numerical Illustrations
In this section, we present a parametric example of our model by specifying the functions
πh (·) ,πl (·) and C (·), and show that worker overconfidence is an important determinant of whether
the firm will favor a non-differentiation wage-setting policy. Alternative parametric specifications
of the model that we explored all gave the same qualitative results.
We specify that both the probability functions of high output and effort cost functions are
exponential, that is, πj (n) = 1 − exp {−ajn} , j ∈ {h, l} and C (n) = exp {λn} − 1 where λ > 0.
Note that C (0) = 0.
The optimal bonus of the firm ∆∗(p, q) is obtained by numerically solving Eq. (7). Notice that
in this exponential model C 000 > 0 and pπ0h + (1− p)π0l is log-concave, so Lemma 1 and in turn
Lemma 4 apply, and Eq. (7) is sufficient to pin down the optimal bonus.
5.1 Understanding the Trade-offs
First, we set the outside options of the firm and the worker to zero (i.e., U0 = V0 = 0) so
that the optimal contract in Proposition 2 is given by ∆∗(p, q) for every pair (p, q). We first show
that the non-differentiation policy can dominate the differentiation policy when the worker’s initial
morale p0 is sufficiently higher than the firm’s initial belief q0 and, by Proposition 3, sufficiently
smaller than 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 depicts the firm’s expected profits under the two policies as a function of the worker’s
initial morale p0 where other parameter values are set at q0 = 1/2, al = 1, ah = 1.5,λ = 1,α =
0.9, y = 2. In this parameter configuration, as well as in those we will explore later in comparative
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statics exercises, it can be verified that effort and ability are local complements for all feasible
effort levels. It is shown in the figure that the non-differential policy provides a higher expected









respectively called the lower and upper (morale) threshold :13 for any {q0,α, al, ah, y} , they are the
two solutions to the following equation in p0:
Ṽ (p0, q0) = [αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0)] Ṽ (ph, qh) + [α(1− q0) + (1− α) q0] Ṽ (pl, ql).
Importantly, the lower threshold for initial worker morale p∗
0
exceeds the firm’s initial belief q0, and
the upper threshold p̄∗0 is less than 1. That is, for the non-differentiation wage policy to dominate
the differentiation policy, workers must be sufficiently but not excessively overconfident.
[Figure 2 about here]
Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the lower threshold p∗
0
as a function of q0. Note that the lower
threshold p∗
0
increases in the firm’s initial belief q0 and is always higher than q0 (note that it lies
above the dashed 45 degree line). Thus overconfidence of the worker relative to the firm’s initial
belief is a necessary condition for the firm to adopt non-differentiation wage policy. Indeed, Panel
A also suggests that overconfidence “begets” overconfidence. To see this, suppose that the true
proportion of high ability workers, q0, is low. Then Panel A indicates that the firm will be very
likely to adopt a non-differentiation policy because the threshold p∗
0
is also low. This implies that
for a given distribution of initial worker beliefs, a firm facing a low quality labor force is more
likely to engage in no wage differentiation. Ex post, the majority of the workers receive a poor
performance evaluation but never learn it, hence they become even more overconfident in their own
ability relative to the firm. Only a minority of the workers lose some of their overconfidence relative
to the firm. So the larger the proportion of low ability overconfident workers to begin with, the
larger the average reenforcement of overconfidence in equilibrium.
Panel B of Figure 2 depicts the upper threshold p̄∗0 as a function of q0. The main message is that
it is very close to 1 (above 0.9999) for the whole domain of q0. To summarize, in this exponential
example, the non-differentiation wage policy is superior if and only if the worker’s initial morale
p0 lies above the lower threshold p
∗
0
and below the upper threshold p̄∗0. The most important fact
is that the lower threshold p∗
0
is higher than q0, which, together with subsequent graphs, implies
that worker overconfidence (but not extreme overconfidence), is a necessary condition for the firm
to adopt a non-differentiation policy.
Why does moderate level of worker overconfidence cause the firm to favor the non-differentiation
over the differentiation policy? The trade-offs between the two policies can be better understood
via the decomposition in expression (12).
13In Figure 1, p̄∗0 is indistinguishable from 1 because of precision level. The actual value of p̄
∗
0 for the figure is
0.999914.
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[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows how the sorting and morale effects change as the worker’s initial morale increases.
Panel A shows that the sorting effect is strictly positive and increases in p0. Panel B shows that
the positive morale effect decreases in p0 and approaches zero as p0 approaches 1. The reason is
simple: the morale boost from knowing of a good performance evaluation gets smaller when the
worker’s initial confidence gets higher (provided that it is higher than q0 = 0.5). Panel C shows
that the negative morale effect initially declines and then reverts to zero. Panel D shows the total
effects, which implies that the non-differentiation policy dominates the differentiation policy if and







[Figure 4 about here]
Why would the negative morale effect start to dominate the other two effects as p0 increases?
From expression (12), we know that two forces shape the relative strength of the negative and
positive morale effects as the worker’s initial morale p0 varies. The first force is statistical, namely
Bayesian updating; and the second force is due to the curvature of Ṽ . The second force is relatively
unimportant because Ṽ is almost linear in p and q. The statistical force is depicted in Figure 4, which
shows the ratio of morale boost from knowing of a good signal over the morale loss from knowing a
bad signal. This ratio declines to (1− α) /α = 1/9 as the worker’s initial morale approaches 1. In
other words, the morale loss from a bad signal will dominate the morale boost from a good signal
as p0 increases. This explains why the negative morale effect will eventually dominate the positive
morale effect as p0 gets large enough.14
5.2 Comparative Statics
The main theoretical and empirical prediction of the model is the range of initial levels of worker
confidence in which the firm will prefer a non-differentiation wage policy to a differentiation policy.






. Since the upper threshold p̄∗0 is invariably
extremely close to 1 (above 0.9999), we will conduct comparative statics of the lower threshold p∗
0
with respect to parameters of the model.
5.2.1 Aggregate Productivity
Aggregate productivity is proxied in our model by the output level y that the worker can achieve
by spending effort. In reality, both individual worker productivities y and outside options are likely
to rise in an expansion. How does y affect the benefits and costs of wage differentiation? Given the
14Note, however, as p0 goes to 1, both morale effects go to zero, even though the negative morale effect dominates
the positive morale effect. Since the sorting effect is always positive, and in fact increases in p0 for a fixed q0, the
differentiation policy “wins” as p0 approaches 1.
20
initial level of worker morale, are firms more willing to engage in non-differentiation wage policy
when y is higher (i.e., in a boom)? Figure 5 depicts the non-monotonic relationship between the
necessary level of worker overconfidence p∗
0
and the aggregate productivity shock y.
[Figure 5 about here]
The reason for the non-monotonic relationship between p∗
0
and y is quite subtle. It can be
numerically verified that, for any fixed belief pair (p, q), the sorting effect is increasing and convex
in y, the negative morale effect is U-shaped in y, and the positive morale effect is inverted U-shaped
in y. The latter two relationships arise because of the curvature of Ṽ . Overall, the total effects have
a U-shaped relationship with y.When the productivity y is small, for any (p, q), the negative morale
effect is small because the discouraged workers are not able to produce too much in any case. Thus,
in order for the firm to prefer a non-differentiation policy, the workers must be quite overconfident,
thus a higher p∗
0
is necessary. When the productivity y is high, the negative morale effect starts
to fall again because the firm offers a higher bonus, so the extrinsic motivation just swamps the
intrinsic motivation; the sorting effect starts to pick up fast since the sorting effect is convex in
y. Thus again a higher worker overconfidence is needed for the firm to adopt a non-differentiation
policy.
The macroeconomic implication of this comparative statics is straightforward. If aggregate
productivity is in the increasing region of Figure 5, then the model predicts that the firm is more
likely to adopt a non-differentiation wage policy when y is low (in a recession) than when y is high
(in a boom). That is, there is more wage compression in a recession. If the firm prefers wage
differentiation, then layoffs of workers with poor performance evaluations will be more likely when
y is low. As Bewley (1999) found, firms must choose between layoffs and wage rigidity in recessions
because selective wage cuts would trigger a loss in morale among those workers, making them no
longer employable.
5.2.2 Effects of Other Parameter Changes
We now describe the effects of other parameter changes on the necessary worker overconfidence
required for the firm to optimally choose the non-differentiation wage policy. The qualitative effects
are rather intuitive. Thus we will only explain these effects and interested readers are referred to
our working paper for more quantitative graphs.
First, for any fixed level of firm belief q0, the level of overconfidence necessary for the non-
differentiation policy to dominate, namely p∗
0
, monotonically increases in α, the precision of perfor-
mance evaluation. The intuition is that, the higher α is, the stronger the sorting effect in favor of
differentiation policy; and thus the more worker overconfidence is required for non-differentiation
policy to be superior.
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Second, worker heterogeneity also affects the firm’s optimal wage-setting policy. Worker hetero-
geneity can be constructed in our numerical example as follows: Keep constant the mean level of
worker ability perceived by the firm at q0ah+(1−q0)al ≡ ā and create mean-preserving increases in
worker heterogeneity by varying ah in the interval [ā, ā/q0] while setting al = (ā− q0ah) / (1− q0) .
In this construction, the larger ah, the higher heterogeneity in worker ability. Numerical examples
show that the necessary level of worker overconfidence required for the non-differentiation policy to
be optimal, namely p∗
0
, increases with worker heterogeneity. This arises because the sorting effect
becomes stronger as the workers become more heterogeneous. In fact, in the extreme case when




equal to 1; hence it never pays the firm to adopt the non-differentiation policy.
So far we assumed that outside options U0 and V0 are both zero and our basic conclusion is
that some worker overconfidence is necessary for the firm to choose the non-differentiation policy.
We now discuss the effects of positive outside options. First, our basic conclusion still holds when
U0 is zero but the firm’s outside option V0 is positive and large enough to bind at some optimal
contract {0,∆∗ (pj, qj)} , j ∈ {0, h, l} . To see why, suppose that the firm prefers to differentiate
when p0 = q0 and U0 = V0 = 0. This implies from our previous calculations that
[αp0 + (1− α) (1− p0)]V (0,∆∗ (ph, ph) ; ph, ph)
+ [α (1− p0) + (1− α) p0]V (0,∆∗ (pl, pl) ; pl, pl)
> V (0,∆∗ (p0, p0) ; p0, p0) ,
since the optimal bonus is given by ∆∗ (pj , pj) when U0 = 0. Now consider an increase in the firm’s
outside option V0. Because V (0,∆
∗ (p, p) ; p, p) increases in p (due to the local complementarity of
effort and ability in this example), the above inequality implies that, for any V0 > 0,
[αp0 + (1− α) (1− p0)]max {V (0,∆∗ (ph, ph) ; ph, ph) , V0}
+ [α (1− p0) + (1− α) p0] max {V (0,∆∗ (pl, pl) ; pl, pl) , V0}
≥ max {V (0,∆∗ (p0, p0) ; p0, p0) , V0} ,
where the inequality is strict except for the uninteresting case where the firm lays off even the most
confident workers after revealing the good news to them. Thus wage differentiation will generally
strictly dominate non-differentiation. Therefore, some worker overconfidence is needed for the firm
to adopt a non-differentiation wage policy.
We can similarly show that our conclusion holds when the firm’s outside option V0 is zero
but workers’ outside option U0 is positive and large enough to bind at some optimal contract
{0,∆∗ (pj, qj)} where j ∈ {0, h, l} . Suppose p0 = q0. Suppose that U0 binds only for workers
with belief pl, i.e., the most pessimistic workers who receive bad news in a differentiation contract.
The differentiation wage contract must offer ∆̄ (pl) > ∆
∗ (pl, pl) to workers with belief pl. In our
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numerical example, it can be shown that, if p0 = q0, then the firm’s expected profit is higher
under the differentiation wage policy for any U0 > 0 as long as U0 is in the range where only the
participation constraints of workers with belief pl bind. Thus again some worker overconfidence is
necessary for the non-differentiation wage policy to be superior.
6 Discussion and Testable Implications
In this section, we first discuss some of our modelling assumptions and results, and then provide
some testable implications of our model.
6.1 Discussion
1. In this paper, a worker’s morale does not directly affect the marginal productivity or the
marginal cost of effort, a purely psychological channel emphasized by Bewley (1999). Instead, we
emphasized an indirect channel: a worker’s morale affects her incentives to exert effort through
affecting the worker’s perceived marginal productivity of effort. However, we believe that our
major insight - workers will react asymmetrically to good and bad news when they are moderately
overconfident - will lead a firm to prefer a non-differentiation wage policy even if the morale affects
marginal productivity or marginal cost of effort directly.
2. We assumed that all workers have identical initial beliefs p0, and the firm also holds identical













, and a large number of workers in each cell. Then as long as
these belief pairs are commonly known by all the workers, the optimal wage setting policy derived





, j = 1, ..., k. Thus in such a firm with many different belief pairs, workers do observe wage
differentiation, but a worker’s morale is only affected by the wage contract offers received by her
co-worker in the same belief pair type, or “reference group” in Akerlof and Yellen (1990)’s language.
3. Our model makes the stark prediction that there is complete wage compression when a firm finds
the non-differentiation wage policy to be superior. This strong prediction is due to the simplifying
assumptions of the model. First, as we mentioned above, when the firm has different types of






, j = 1, ..., k, the economic forces we highlight in this
paper will be consistent with within-firm wage differentiation even when the firm favors the non-






, j = 1, ..., k. Second, we assumed in the paper
a very restricted space for the performance evaluation signals with only θ ∈ {l, h} . As we enrich
the signal space to include more performance evaluation outcomes, it is conceivable that the morale
concerns emphasized in our paper will lead a firm to favor a semi-pooling wage policy as follows:
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the firm reveals extremely good and extremely bad news, but conceal all mediocre news.15 Under
such a wage policy, we will then observe wage compression, but not complete wage equalization,
within the firm.
4. A staple of our analysis is that workers are overconfident about their own ability. We then
investigate the implication of such overconfidence on the firm’s wage setting policy under the
assumption that workers process information revealed by the firm’s wage contracts in a rational
Bayesian fashion. In other words, the workers’ bias in our model lies in the prior, not in the
information processing. A different approach would be to assume that workers have the correct
initial belief, but are biased in their information processing, for example, that they suffer from
attribution bias as mentioned in Section 2. When workers suffer from severe attribution bias, the
firm will undoubtedly be in favor of a differentiation policy. The reason is obvious: workers who
receive bad news will simply attribute it to bad luck and hence will not lower their morale; but
workers who receive good news will boost their morale. Of course, any worker who suffers from
attribution bias will mostly likely have been overconfident by the time they join the work force.
Thus, it seems that worker overconfidence is a natural assumption. When the workers are biased
in both their initial beliefs and their information processing, the economic forces emphasized in our
model will survive, albeit reduced in strength.
5. In this paper a worker’s outside option is unaffected by her confidence level due to the as-
sumption that a worker’s ability is firm-specific. This assumption effectively makes labor market
competition irrelevant in our setting. An interesting adverse selection issue would arise if workers’
ability were general. That is, a firm’s wage-setting policy would affect the characteristics of its
workforce, much in the same way as the design of an insurance policy would affect the pool of
insurees. In such a general equilibrium model, the degree of labor market competition will also
affect whether or not it is optimal for the firms to adopt a non-differentiation wage-setting policy.
It is conceivable that wage non-differentiation would be more common in less competitive labor
markets. We leave the verification of this conjecture for future research.
6.2 Testable Implications
1. One testable implication of our model is that wage differentiation is more prevalent in environ-
ments where it is harder to find out the wage offers received by co-workers. One such comparison is
offered by public versus private universities. Public universities by law have to publicly disclose the
salaries of all professors; while private universities do not have to. Thus the morale ramifications
of wage differentiation will be larger in public universities, where we expect to observe less wage
15This seems to be the policy of GE under the leadership of Jack Welch. In Chapter 11 of Welch (2001), he said:
“Differentiation comes down to sorting out the A, B, and C players.” The top 20 percent of the players are identified
as the A players and highly rewarded; the bottom 10 percent are identified as the C players and fired; and the middle
70 percent are identified as B players.
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differentiation than in private universities.
2. A second testable implication of our model is that wage differentiation is more prevalent if
the firm can convincingly use some observable and objective criteria to justify such differentiation.
The reason is very simple: wage differentiation based on observable and objective criteria have
little effect on worker morale; while wage differentiation under the firm’s discretion will convey
the firm’s private information about the workers and affect their morale. For example, affirmative
action laws may impose differential treatment of equally productive workers, which is beyond the
control of the firm and is common knowledge. In a “pure” fair-wage model, à la Akerlof and Yellen
(1990), workers would still feel the pinch of wage differentiation and alter their effort, even if they
were convinced of objective reasons unrelated to their productivities. Of course, one could argue
that these objective reasons shape the “reference group” of workers, which is relevant for wage
comparisons in the fair-wage model. In providing a micro-foundation of the fair-wage hypothesis,
our model suggests operationally how to define the reference group.
3. Our model predicts that, over a wide range of parameters, wage differentiation is directly
related to the level of aggregate productivity. The available empirical evidence seems to suggest
that income inequality is countercyclical. However, this is far from a robust empirical regularity.
More importantly, our prediction concerns wage compression among continuing workers within the
same firm. The cyclicality of wage inequality depends to a large extent on composition effects in
employment and firms, and the anti-cyclicality of income inequality is certainly generated to some
extent by that of unemployment.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the implications of worker overconfidence, which is supported by
a large body of psychological evidence, on the optimal wage-setting policies of the firms. More
specifically, we examine the optimal contract design problem of a principal facing many agents.
The principal privately observes individualized performance evaluations of the agents, and decides
if it is in its interest to offer them different incentive contracts depending on, thus revealing, their
performance evaluations.
We decompose the trade-offs between a differentiation and non-differentiation policy into three
components: first, a sorting effect, which allows the firm to tailor individual contracts to her per-
ceived ability, in favor of the differentiation policy; second, a morale boost effect, which means that
the morale of the workers with high performance evaluation will be enhanced under a differentia-
tion policy; and third, a morale loss effect, which means that the morale of the workers with low
performance evaluation will be hurt under a differentiation policy. We show in numerical examples
and conjecture in general that the differentiation policy dominates the non-differentiation policy
when the firm and workers share identical initial beliefs. However, worker overconfidence can effec-
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tively tilt the balance in favor of the non-differentiation policy. We robustly show in examples that
when workers are sufficiently overconfident than the firm, the non-differentiation policy can be the
optimal policy. By providing a theoretical link between worker overconfidence and wage-setting
practices of the firm, we help explain why firms emphasize against wage disclosure, and abstain
from wage differentiation among their workers, as documented by Bewley (1999).
The most interesting extension of the model is to introduce dynamics. As firms accumulate more
(private) evidence of the worker, while engaging in non-differentiation wage policy, it is possible
that at a certain point, the trade-off may be in favor of differentiation policy. At that time, workers
who have accumulated a string of bad performance evaluations, but never told so earlier, will receive
the full string of news in one dosage, even being laid off.
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Figure 1: Firm’s expected profits under differentiation (solid curve) and non-differentiation (dashed
curve) policies as a function of the worker’s initial morale p0. Other parameter values are set at
q0 = 0.5, al = 1, ah = 1.5,λ = 1,α = 0.9, y = 2, U0 = V0 = 0.
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The dashed line is
the 45° line.











Figure 2: The lower and upper thresholds p∗
0
and p̄∗0 as a function of q0 α = 0.9, al = 1, ah = 1.5, y =
2, U0 = V0 = 0.
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Negative Morale Effect Panel C























Sorting Effect Panel A









Positive Morale Effect Panel B
Figure 3: Sorting and morale effects as functions of worker morale p0 : q0 = 0.5, al = 1, ah =
1.5, y = 2,α = 0.9, U0 = V0 = 0.
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Figure 4: The ratio of morale boost over morale loss as a function of p0 : α = 0.9.
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Figure 5: The relationship between p∗
0
and y : q0 = 0.5, al = 1, ah = 1.5,α = 0.9, U0 = V0 = 0.
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Note that the firm’s expected output is bounded above by qy (when n =∞). Since the firm
can guarantee itself V0 ≥ 0, the firm will for sure choose w ≤ qy and ∆ ≤ y. We can without loss
of generality restrict the firm’s feasible contract set to
{(w,∆) : w ∈ [0, qy] , ∆ ∈ [∆, y] , U (w,∆; p) ≥ U0} ,
Since U is continuous in (w,∆) , this is a compact set. Since V (w,∆; p, q) is continuous, by
Weierstrass Theorem it has a maximum, which we can then compare with V0. Thus (5) always has
a solution.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof. If w > 0 but (2) does not bind, then the firm could slightly reduce w without changing
the incentives to exert effort, since n∗ depends only on the bonus ∆; and without violating the
participation constraint of the worker. This increases the firm’s profits, a contradiction to the firm’s
optimality.
Proof of Lemma 2:
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where, with some abuse of notation, we write n∗0 ≡ ∂n∗(∆, p)/∂∆. After imposing the common
denominator as {C00 −∆ [pπ00h + (1− p)π00l ]}2 , the numerator is£
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which is clearly negative when C 000 ≥ 0 and pπ0h + (1− p)π0l is log-concave.
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Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. Under the assumption,
Ṽ (p0, q0) = [q0πh(n
∗(∆∗(p0, q0), p0)) + (1− q0)πl(n∗(∆∗(p0, q0), p0))] [y −∆∗(p0, q0)]




+ (1− qh)πl(n∗(∆∗(p0, q0), p0))
¸
[y −∆∗(p0, q0)]




+ (1− ql)πl(n∗(∆∗(p0, q0), p0))
¸
[y −∆∗(p0, q0)]
< [αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0)]
·
qhπh (n
∗ (∆∗ (p0, qh) , p0))
+ (1− qh)πl (n∗ (∆∗ (p0, qh) , p0))
¸
[y −∆∗ (p0, qh)]
+ [α(1− q0) + (1− α) q0]
·
qlπh (n
∗ (∆∗ (p0, ql) , p0))
+ (1− ql)πl (n∗ (∆∗ (p0, ql) , p0))
¸
[y −∆∗ (p0, ql)]
= [αq0 + (1− α) (1− q0)] Ṽ (p0, qh) + [α(1− q0) + (1− α) q0] Ṽ (p0, ql) ,
where the second equality follows from the martingale property of Bayes’ updating; and the in-
equality follows from revealed profit maximization of the firm and the fact that the firm’s objective
function in problem (6) is nonlinear.
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